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Abstract
Empirical literature ﬁndings do not provide a clear-cut interpretation of the ef-
fects of public aid on ﬁrms’ performances. We contribute to this literature analysing
the eﬀects of public regional subsidies on investment using a new dataset covering all
the ﬁrms in the Italian province of Trento, along with a record of public aid granted
in the last 15 years. We ﬁnd permanent positive eﬀects of aid on ﬁrms’ size, but no
eﬀect is found on factor substitution, nor on technical change. Moreover, subsidies
do not improve either proﬁtability or productivity. These results help better deﬁne
the scope for local aid.
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In this paper we address the issue of the eﬀectiveness of local public direct subsidies
to ﬁrms. Recently, the interest of policy makers in the topic has been growing rapidly.
While the most traditional justiﬁcation for public aid to ﬁrms was job creation, present
policies seem to be driven mainly by the hope of boosting productivity. There is a
widespread belief among policy makers, that public subsidies can help the private sector
to enter a path of more rapid productivity growth, thus sheltering economies from the
competition of low labour cost countries. This argument gains strength when applied
to small ﬁrms. Innovation and improvement of processes are introduced into the small
and medium enterprises mainly through investment and the renovation of capital goods:
subsidies to investments are viewed by policymakers as a method to foster the adoption
of innovation by SME. The same European regulation gives a looser deﬁnition to state
aid to SME.
Despite the popularity of state and regional aid to ﬁrms, there is no clear rationale
nor empirical ground that might help the design of aid schemes.
Theoretical rationale for public aid has been widely discussed. Evidence for the tradi-
tional argument for subsidies, namely market failures or imperfections, has been presented
to justify subsidies to R&D investments (David, Hall and Toole, 2000), credit sub-
sidies (Vittas and Cho, 1995), and export subsidies (Abbott et al., 1987). Rodik
(2004) highlights the problems of underinvestment in innovation that stem from infor-
mation externalities and the lack of co-ordination. He describes a set of criteria for
public intervention coherent with this view. Following this view, the literature on growth
stresses the idea that, in presence of diminishing returns of capital, investments should
be directed towards less developed areas that, in principle, can give higher returns on
investments (Angrist and Hahn, 1999). However, the convergence process might occur
too slowly to be socially acceptable, hence the need to subsidize underdeveloped areas.
2On the other hand, the literature on localization (Fujita and Krugman, 1995) stresses
the importance of policies aimed at attracting mobile resources, such as capitals, en-
trepreneurs, and specialized labor, that, idiosyncratically combined with local immobile
resources, allow for local positive externalities from aggregation. The obvious counter-
arguments – see for instance Bergstr¨ om (2000) – identify two main causes of failures
of the subsidizing eﬀorts. First public aid displaces private investments; second, it causes
technical and allocation ineﬃciencies.
Empirical investigation into the eﬀects of subsidies on growth and productivity seems,
on the other hand, to be problematic at best. Public policies are seldom designed with
clear goals. Policies targeted at productivity growth are not always distinguishable from
ones aiming at sustaining employment; moreover, speciﬁc schemes are often biased in favor
of more inﬂuential sectors and industries which capture political interests. Doubts about
the eﬀectiveness of public aid to ﬁrms are widespread. Studies on the eﬀect of subsidies in
developed Asian countries, for instance, point to a negative eﬀect on productivity (Lee,
1996; Beason and Weinstein, 1996; Harris and Trainor, 2005). Studies about EU
countries raise similar doubts – see for instance Roper (2003). Similarly Bagella and
Becchetti (1998), studying Italian data, ﬁnd a set of partly contradictory results. In
the short run, subsidies seem to cause a higher level of indebtedness for ﬁrms which
receive them with non-decreasing costs of debt, so apparently there is no mis-allocation of
ﬁnancial resources. In the long run, subsidized ﬁrms exhibit lower levels of productivity
when compared to non-subsidized ones, lending support to the idea that this exogenous
”shock” is re-absorbed by the market. A couple of studies (Pellegrini and Centra,
2006; Bronzini and De Blasio, 2006) on the eﬀects of the Italian Law 488/92, that
drafted an innovative auction scheme for allocating subsidies, report diﬀerent conclusions
on the eﬀects of state aid, but they both share the view that the impact of subsidies on
productivity is weak or nil.
Starting from these considerations we aim at giving a contribution to the current
3empirical literature on public subsidies on two diﬀerent levels.
The ﬁrst contribution is methodological: we made use of a modiﬁed propensity score
matching model in order to detect the eﬀects of a treatment. Such a methodological ap-
proach helped us shed light on the causal link between the grants and ﬁrms’ performances,
measured in terms of variation of growth rates, productivity level and proﬁtability.
A second contribution lies in the evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of aid policy on ﬁrms
performance and behaviour. On the basis of a new database we tested the causal eﬀects
both in the short and in the long run, attempting to provide an interpretation of the
results. In particular, we distinguish wearing oﬀ from long lasting eﬀects of public polict,
and we discuss them.
The paper is set out as follows: section 2 looks at the economic and social motivations
usually associated with public subsidies from a local viewpoint. Sections 3 and 4, respec-
tively, present the dataset and the methodology we used. Section 5 includes a description
of the results and analysis and is followed by the conclusions in section 6.
2 The provision of the law and the research hypoth-
esis
Our research into the eﬀect of local subsidies is based on the case of Trentino Province
and in particular, as mentioned in the introduction, on the evaluation of the impact
of the Provincial Law 4/81 (PL 4/81 henceforth) on the competitiveness of local ﬁrms.
Due to its special status of autonomy, the Province is responsible for allocating the large
majority of public aid that is given to ﬁrms: during the time span we studied, the amount
of total subsidies directly handled by the local government, was between 90% and 95%
(Brancati (2005)).
The PL 4/81 was the means by with which local government could intervene in the
4local economy in order to attempt to stimulate entrepreneurial activity and, in general,
to make local industries more dynamic. It was the main means of local government
intervention and lasted from 1981 until the early years of the 21st century, when it was
substituted by new legislation, namely the PL 6/99.
All the ﬁrms operating in Trentino which fulﬁlled the requirements within the scope
of the PL 4/81 at the time were eligible to receive a direct ﬁnancial subsidy from local
government. The participation in the programme was limited to ﬁrms who could submit
a formal application and respect the stated criteria – e.g. a viable ﬁnancial condition, a
reasonable investment project substantially related to the grant requested.
The local bureau for industrial policy selected the investment projects following the
guidelines provided with the PL 4/81 until the allotted funds per year was exhausted.
The law laid down two main directives for intervention. The ﬁrst one can be summarized
broadly in into four diﬀerent aims: (1) to foster entrepreneurship; (2) to stimulate the
enlargement of existing ﬁrms; (3) to stimulate the process of industrial conversion, i.e.
the innovation of production processes; (4) to sustain the local employment level. The
second directive is related to the morphological aspects of the province and it aims to
favor and sustain ﬁrms acting in depressed areas.
The law also foresaw a list of strategic sectors for intervention. These sectors were
singled out, ﬁrstly, by looking at the past performance of sectors in Trentino compared to
the corresponding Italian National performance. Secondly, the law proposed a comparison
of the dynamics of local sectors with that of international sectors. In particular, sectors
considered more eligible for interventions were listed: mining and quarrying (with the
exclusion of metal), the manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, the manufac-
ture of mechanical products, the manufacture of electrical and electronic machinery, the
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, the manufacture of paper and
paper products, publishing and printing, textiles and transports. The law during its long
period of validity was modiﬁed several times to account for the dynamics of the various
5sectors and to ﬁne-tune the type of intervention to counter-act the eﬀects of the business
cycle, but its inspiring principles remained unchanged.
Our goal is to point out some hypotheses on the eﬀects of aid on ﬁrm structure,
behaviour and performance, as using ﬁrm level micro-data, we cannot test for the expected
eﬀects on the whole region.
• Subsidies help ﬁrms grow, mainly in terms of capturing market opportunities oth-
erwise neglected (H1);
• Subsidies help ﬁrms improve their competitiveness, mainly reaching higher levels of
productivity (H2);
• If both growth and productivity eﬀects were present, this would be a clear indication
that subsidies triggered an endogenous growth process (H3).
3 Data description
The empirical research is based on an original and unique database built specially to
deal with the issues focused on in the paper. The major advantages of the dataset we
used are the following: (a) It covers all the limited liability ﬁrms in Trentino – an Italian
province in the “North-East” macroregion – during the period 1998-2003 (PINC8199)1;
(b) it accounts for entry and exit of ﬁrms; (c) the unit of observation was given by the
individual ﬁrm; (d) it contains balance sheet information as well as data on direct public
ﬁnancial subsidies to private ﬁrms; (e) the sectoral coverage of the database covers all the
sectors within the scope of PL 4/81 regulating the concession of subsidies.
The sources of data are the Local Bureau of Statistics (Servizio Statistico della Provin-
cia Autonoma di Trento, SSPAT) and the Servizio Industria della Provincia Autonoma di
Trento (i.e. the local Bureau for Industrial Policy) which provided, respectively, balance
6sheet information and public subsidies information about grants given to ﬁrms operating
in the province.
In particular, SSPAT provided annual data – the Pitagora dataset – that contain
balance sheet information about each limited ﬁrm together with information about the
number of employees in each ﬁrm. The latter information is found on the individual
forms that employers send monthly to the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS)2. The
second source is the Local Bureau for Industrial Policy that gave us access to the whole
set of administrative archives which record all public grants given to ﬁrms operating in
the province in the context of the PL 4/81: the INCE dataset. The original unit of
observation was a single grant given to a ﬁrm in a given year. Subsequently, we re-
organized the information in order to match ﬁrm level data with the Pitagora yearly
database. In particular, we adjusted the data taking into account the timing of each
grant.
The PINC8199 panel data was created by merging the two ﬁrm level datasets: Pitagora
and INCE. We applied a ﬁltering procedure in order to select the industries we wanted
to focus on, i.e. within the scope of the PL 4/81 object of study. We selected ﬁrms based
on the two digits ISIC sectors classiﬁcation. In particular, we considered the following
industries that correspond to the broad deﬁnition of ”industrial sectors” contained in
the PL 4/81: (a) from 10 to 14: mining; (b) from 15 to 40: manufacturing; (c) 45:
constructions; (d) from 60 to 62: transport; (e) 72: computer and related activities; (f)
90: sewage and refuse disposal.
The overall number of grants per year is reported in Table 1.
Our analysis refers to the period 1998-2003 when the sample size of treated ﬁrms
seems to be suﬃcient with respect to the methodology we used in our study. The overall
distribution of yearly frequencies is shown in Table 2.
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In this study we refer mainly to a balanced panel which is made up of a subset of
ﬁrms that are always present in the database during the time window we refer to. The
number of observations per year ensures a good statistical tractability of data. In Table
2 information about the overall number of ﬁrms covered by the database is shown.
Information contained in the database can be grouped into three main categories: (1)
demographic information regarding each ﬁrm that appears in both the Pitagora and the
INCE datasets3; (2) Balance sheet variables (coming from the Pitagora dataset) that we
used to create the indicators used in the analysis; (3) information on subsidies coming
from the INCE dataset, re-classiﬁed into yearly dummy variables showing the existence
of a grant given to the ﬁrm in that given year.
%%%%%%%%%%%%
table 2 around here
%%%%%%%%%%%%
4 Methodology and assumptions
4.1 Methodology
The evaluation of the impact of public policy can be framed as a problem of inference
where a group of units is subject to speciﬁc treatment (i.e. receiving a direct ﬁnancial
aid). In such a framework a comparison is made between the treated group and the
control group (the units not included in the programme); nevertheless, this comparison
could lead to biased estimations due to selection bias and observable and unobservable
diﬀerences between the units comprised in the two groups (Deheja and Wahba, 2002).
In our case, the selection bias arises from the fact that incentive programs are not set in
8the context of a random or a natural experiment in which ﬁrms are selected randomly
for treatment 4. As a consequence, the study of the economic eﬀects of public subsidies
cannot be carried out using the standard regression techniques.
This is the reason that spurred us to use the propensity score matching literature
to deal with the issue. In our framework we can consider the impact of subsidies as a
particular example of the general problem of the evaluation of the average eﬀect of a
treatment in a sample, in which both treated and untreated units are present (Imbens
and Rubin, 1997; Angrist and Hahn, 1999)5. In particular, in our study we had to
estimate the eﬀect a public subsidy (treatment) on diﬀerent aspects of ﬁrms’ performances
(objective variables). As mentioned, the major issue arising in such a framework is that
the assignment to treatment might not be completely random: it might be that observable
and unobservable characteristics of the ﬁrm inﬂuence the probability of receiving such a
subsidy.
In formal terms we deﬁne, for each ﬁrm i , an objective variable (Yi) potentially aﬀected
by the treatment. We start with considering the realization of such a variable at time t
as the result of the linear combination of the two potential outcomes. Potential outcomes
are deﬁned as the values that the variable Yi can assume in the situation of incompatible
events: (a) the ﬁrm i beneﬁts from a grant (Di = 1); (b) the ﬁrm i did not receive any
subsidy (Di = 0). So that we can write for variable Yi:
Yi = Yi(1)Di + (1 − Di)Yi(0). (1)
From a theoretical point of view we are interested in estimating the causal eﬀect of the
treatment D given by the quantity:
∆Yi = Yi(1) − Yi(0), (2)
9However, this value is not readily available, being the linear combination of a factual and
a counterfactual observation. In order to make our estimation, we have to abandon the
individual level and look at the average eﬀect of the treatment on the sample, that is
given by the following:
τ = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)]. (3)
Moreover we can be interested in in population average treatment eﬀect for the treated
deﬁned by:
τ
p,T = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Di = 1], (4)
which is of particular interest in our context6.
In order to obtain an unbiased estimation of the average eﬀect of the treatment, i.e.
to make the observable values E{Y |Di = 1,X = x} and E{Y |Di = 0,X = x} good
approximations of their theoretical values we must assume the independence of potential
outcomes:
D ⊥ (Y (0),Y (1)). (5)
Moreover, in order to neutralize the eﬀects of self selection of ﬁrms into the treatment,
given by their individual observable characteristics (X), we relax the assumption (5):
D ⊥ (Y (0),Y (1))|X, (6)
The above assumption is called the unconfoundedness hypothesis (Rosebaum and Rubin,
1983; Lechner, 2002) and ensures that given the values of pre-treatment variables the





x|Di = 1}, (7)
in which τp
x is deﬁned by the following:
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p
x = E{Yi(1) − Yi(0)|X = x} =
= E{Y |Di = 1,X = x} − E{Y |Di = 0,X = x}. (8)
Note again that the particular database we use for the study allows us to consider the
population average eﬀect of the treatment on treated avoiding any bias arising from
sampling schemes7.
If the number of variables is high, then a problem of dimensionality can arise. To
overcome such dimensionality problems we can introduce the so-called propensity score
(PS). The PS represents the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given the
pre-treatment variables. In formal terms:
P(x) = Prob(D = 1|X = x). (9)
It is possible to show that, if the two following properties hold, the estimation procedure
ensures a bias reduction (Rosebaum and Rubin, 1983)8:
• Balancing property: D ⊥ X|P(X); this guarantees that given the propensity score
the treatment and the observable variables are independent;
• Unconfoundedness property: if Y (1),Y (0) ⊥ D|X then Y (1),Y (0) ⊥ D|P(X); this
ensures that given the propensity score the treatment and the potential outcomes
are independent.





P(X)|Di = 1}, (10)
11in which τ
p
P(X) is deﬁned by the following:
τ
p
P(X) = E{Yi(1) − Yi(0)|P(X)} =
= E{Y |Di = 1,P(X)} − E{Y |Di = 0,P(X)}. (11)
τp can be computed using diﬀerent matching algorithms9.
A matching estimator (ME) is a method that makes it possible to compare one, or
more than one, treated unit belonging to a stratum with other(s) non treated member(s)
of the sample from the same stratum. In other words, an ME, once the assumptions for
the PS are satisﬁed, makes it possible to compare treated and control units that are alike
at least in their observable characteristics, allowing for a bias reduction in the estimation
of ATT. In the present study, all the results refer to the stratiﬁcation matching estimator
that seems to ensure a more extensive use of the set of controls available in our database10.
In formal terms we have the following estimation in each stratum q constructed using the
values of PS estimated in the ﬁrst step of the method:
τ
S
q = E[Y |D = 1,Q = q] − E[Y |D = 0,Q = q], (12)




q ] = Eq[E[Y |D = 1,Q = q] − E[Y |D = 0,Q = q]], (13)
We should note that the above estimator is ill suited to deal with time invariant non-
observable heterogeneity of ﬁrms. In other words, there may be systematic diﬀerences
between participant and nonparticipant outcomes even after conditioning on observable
variables. Consequently the use of the above estimator could lead to a bias due to un-
resolved idiosyncratic factors. For this reason we employ a modiﬁcation of the method
exposed. It can be shown that the conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator (CDID)
12washes away such idiosyncratic factors (Smith and Todd, 2005). We implemented the
panel data version of the ATT estimator which reveals itself as being more bias-reducing.
It can be deﬁned by the following:
τCDID = Eq[τ
S
CDID,q] = Eq[E[(Y (t)|D = 1,Q = q) − (Y (t
0)|D = 1,Q = q)] +
−E[(Y (t)|D = 0,Q = q) − (Y (t
0)|D = 0,Q = q)]], (14)
in which t and t0 are time periods after and before the treatment inclusion, respectively.
4.2 Assumptions and model design
We used the propensity score matching approach to estimate the average treatment eﬀect
on treated units (ATT). We assumed that once ﬁrms received the notiﬁcation of the
forthcoming subsidy they would incorporate the event in their decisions. As a result,
the behavior of each ﬁrm is immediately inﬂuenced by the decision of the policy-maker
to provide additional funds. In other words, we attribute a high degree of rationality to
ﬁrms, in line with standard assumptions in economic literature;
Our model formulation design aims at discriminating between short run and long run
eﬀects of the direct subsidies. Hence, we assumed two diﬀerent perspectives in evaluating
ﬁrms responses to subsidies:
1. a short term view, in which we try to disentangle the eﬀect of treatment after a
period of 2 years from the time when the subsidy was granted;
2. a long term view wherein we evaluate ﬁrms’ performances 3-4 years after the decision
to assign a grant.
The choice of the matching algorithm was made taking into account both the constraints
arising from the data availability as well as the necessities arising from the study. We
calculated diﬀerent matching estimators. Preliminary results show that estimators that
13allow the re-use of the same treated variables and that compare each treated unit with
an average of the control units are prefereable. In particular we tried: stratiﬁcation with
respect to the score, the nearest-neighbour matching, the radius matching and the kernel
matching. In this paper, we only present the results of the stratiﬁcation method, as they
appear to be more reliable. Results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when other estimators
are used.
The technical steps that we followed to implement the above-mentioned strategy are
the following:
1. We generated a dummy variable (treat9899) that assumes the value 1 for those ﬁrms
who received a subsidy in the two year period 1998-1999 and zero otherwise;
2. we estimated the propensity score with reference to the same two years period using
as independent variables a set of indicators which refer to the year 1998, prior to
treatment in order to check for causality. Then, we tested for the balancing property.
The ﬁnal speciﬁcation of the estimated PS model was chosen aiming at satisfying
the balancing property;
3. Using the propensity score, we estimated a stratiﬁcation matching estimator in
the conditional diﬀerences–in–diﬀerences speciﬁcation in which the variables under
observation refer to the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.
5 Results and analysis
5.1 The estimation of the propensity score
The ﬁrst step of our analysis regards the estimation of the PS. We recall that the functional
form and the explicative variables of our chosen PS, take into account the need to satisfy
the balancing property; nevertheless it is possible to obtain interesting information from
14its estimation. We refer to years 1998 and 1999 when focusing on the subsidies and to year
1998 for the control variables. The rationale behind the choice is prompted by the need
to estimate the probability of being included for treatment given a set of idiosyncratic
factors that can be considered logically and causally antecedent to the treatment itself.
The control group we refer to is made up of all ﬁrms that did not receive aid within the
PL 4/81 in the period 1990-2003. The choice helps us avoid any bias arising from past
public interventions. However, as a consequence, the sample size of the balanced panel
is reduced to 577 ﬁrms. In equation (15) we show the PS functional form used in the
analysis in which the logit speciﬁcation was chosen11:
Pr(treat9899 = 1) = α + β0dadd99 + β1add98du + β2invadd98
+β3invaddsq98 + β4roesq98 + β5roisq98 + β6roiroe98 +
β7kxadd98 + β8V Axadd98 + β9at1dd + β10at1df + ε, (15)
in which we suppressed the index i referring to each ﬁrm for i ∈ I – i.e. in the set of ﬁrms
belonging to the balanced panel. The variables included in the analysis represent the
set of observable characteristics of ﬁrms that we thought could inﬂuence the probability
of being involved in the subsidies programme. In particular, we consider: a dummy
for micro-ﬁrms - with one or two employees - (add98du), the growth rate for year 1999
(dad99), investments per employee as a linear term (invadd98) and as a quadratic term
(invaddsq98), the return on equity (ROE98) in the quadratic speciﬁcation (roesq98),
the return on investments (roi98), the interaction between ROI and ROE (roiroe98), the
capital intensity (kxadd98), the value added per employee (V Axadd98) and two macro-
sector dummies: at1dd for manufacturing and at1df to indicate the constructions sector.
The estimations results (see Table 3) show a signiﬁcant negative impact of the size of
ﬁrms and of the return on equity on the propensity of ﬁrms to be selected for aid, while
the value added per employee has a positive inﬂuence. As we expected the manufacturing
15sector prevails. Moreover, a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect emerges for the capacity of growth
of ﬁrms. Summary statistics reveal a good degree of ﬁt: the R2 indicates that we captures
almost 20% of variability and the χ2 test allowed us to reject the null hypothesis of zero
value for all the coeﬃcients considered.
%%%%%%%%%%%%
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The stratiﬁcation of subsidized and non-subsidized ﬁrms into diﬀerent blocks left us
with seven groups. Such classiﬁcation allowed us to verify the balancing property and
reveals a good degree of overlapping between the two distributions (see Table 4 ). The
estimations of ATTs refer to the common support of these two distributions to reduce the
results’ bias (see again Rosebaum and Rubin (1983)).
%%%%%%%%%%%%
table 4 around here
%%%%%%%%%%%%
5.2 The estimation of the average treatment eﬀect of direct sub-
sidies to ﬁrms
The analysis looks at several aspects of ﬁrms performances. We looked initially at the
direct impact of subsidies on ﬁrms’ investments, in order to check the coherence of our
methodology. Indeed, we expected a positive eﬀect for aid recipients at least in the
short run, given that we are focusing on subsidies directly related to investment projects.
Secondly, we concentrated our attention on ﬁrms’ economic performances, looking ﬁrst at
sales, then at classic ﬁnancial indexes, namely the return on investments (ROI), the return
on equity (ROE) and the EBITDA per employee. Finally, we moved on to the analysis
16of labour and capital productivity in order to understand whether public aid is able to
generate a change in the technological trajectories. To be able to study the latter point in
further depth, we analyzed changes in capital intensity to discover evidence for variations
in factors’ combination. Finally, we took into consideration the impact on ﬁrms’ growth.
Table 5 shows the results of our comparisons between subsidized and non-subsidized
ﬁrms for the three years 2001, 2002 and 2003. The table shows ATTs that express the
average eﬀect of public subsidies on the ﬁrms involved in the programme. The ATT values
are obtained using the stratiﬁcation method, which allows us to compare each treated ﬁrm
in a stratum with a linear combination of control ﬁrms belonging to the same stratum.
Once the eﬀects of treatment on treated in every block has been estimated, a weighted
average is calculated using the relative frequency of treated ﬁrms in a strata as weights.
The CDID estimator compares the ﬁrst-diﬀerences between, respectively, pre–treatment
and post–treatment objective variables under analysis referring to 1998 for pre–treatment
variables and to 2001, 2002 and 2003 for post–treatment variables on which the evaluation
is made. The particular estimator adopted (CDID) makes it possible to cancel out the
time invariant unobservable heterogeneity. The diﬀerent unit of measurement that each
objective variable refers to has to be taken into account when the results are interpreted,
e.g. a coeﬃcient of four for the level of employment means that on average a treated ﬁrm
is able to hire four employees more than if it had not received the subsidy. In addition to
ATT, the table shows bootstrapped standard errors and the t values12.
%%%%%%%%%%%%
table 5 around here
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If we look at the impact of aid on investments we can note that there is a positive
eﬀect one and two years after the grant. The third year the eﬀect wear oﬀ. In other
words, ﬁrms motivated by the subsidy, tend to invest more – compared with ﬁrms who
17do not receive any subsidy – in the short run. This investment corresponds to jump in
ﬁxed assets that happens once in time, afterwards the path of asset growth does not diﬀer
from non-subsidized ﬁrms.
We do observe a signiﬁcant eﬀect of subsidies depending on the size of ﬁrms, both in
the number of employees and the total sales. Nonetheless, the eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s rate
of growth seems to wear oﬀ after three years. Higher sales for subsidized ﬁrms support
the view that investments are at least partly aimed at sustaining growth; however, while
there is a jump in levels, we do not observe a stable modiﬁcation of the growth patterns
of ﬁrms.
We went on then investigate, consulting ROI, whether the investments undertaken
using public funds are more proﬁtable looking. Even when the impact is positive in every
years the – relatively – high magnitude of standard errors do not let us conclude in favor of
a higher ROI. Looking at EBITDA per employee, a short run eﬀect seems to be present,
but this result could be inﬂuenced by the accounting schemes used by Italian ﬁrms to
register the public subsidies. No signiﬁcant eﬀect emerges regarding ROE, conﬁrming
that no clear evidence of a link between public funds end ﬁrms performance exists.
The analysis of labor productivity reveals a temporary positive eﬀect that is re-
absorbed after one year. On the other hand, capital productivity does not show any
signiﬁcant eﬀect. The latter evidence, combined with an insigniﬁcant impact on capital
intensity, suggests that subsidies do not induce a re-combination of factors leading to more
productive techniques. Finally, the capital-labour ratio does not seem to be aﬀected.
5.3 Discussion
The collection of empirical evidences we have obtained, calls for some coherent hypothesis
of the eﬀects of subsidies on ﬁrms behaviour. The joint increase of capital, labour and
sales, with respect to non-subsidized ﬁrms, suggest that ﬁrms expand to match market
18opportunities lending support to our hypothesis (H1). Public aid induce ﬁrms to modify
their investment plans. Nonetheless, there are no hints that investments have important
eﬀects on productivity, either through capital deepening or through technical change,
thereby suggesting that we should refuse our research assumption (H2). Firms appear,
however, to scale up simply using technology they have already used in the past, despite
the capital incentives, i.e. they use the same combination of factors 13.
The increase in investment level could suggest that ﬁrms are actually taking on projects
that in absence of subsidies should have been discarded, probably for their lower internal
rate of returns. Nonetheless, it is not easy to capture such evidence from our results. In
fact, the expected lower degree of proﬁtability of additional investments is diluted by the
previous ones.
A bit puzzling is the temporary increase of labour productivity. This could be due
by the fact that, in the short term, capital is mixed with higher marginal productivity
labour 14.
Summing up, we have hints supporting our hypothesis (H1), while our hypothesis
(H2) are not supported by data. Nevertheless, a most important conclusion is that the
assumption (H3) has to be rejected, i.e. public aids do not help in starting oﬀ any process
of growth of local industrial system. This means that, as a consequence of a public subsidy,
ﬁrms have the chance to seize some market opportunity, otherwise neglected. Whether
this was good or not from a public point of view, it is hard to say. From one hand, it
can be asserted that a larger size of ﬁrms can be one of the goals of a regional industrial
policy aimed at strengthening the local industrial structure. On the other hand, one can
maintain the view that a larger size is of value as far as it helps build a more competitive
industrial structure, able to sustain an endogenous growth. Occasional growth like the
one we observe could instead be induced by the fact that a subsidy makes it possible
to accept investments with an internal rate of return lower than market cost of capital
adjusted for the risk. If this was the case, the game would end in a displacement eﬀect.
196 Conclusions
In this paper we have dealt with the issue of the eﬀectiveness of public subsidies on a
regional industrial system. Using an original database we analyzed the eﬀects of public
aid on ﬁrms performance in a local economy, the Trentino province, in the North-East of
Italy.
The theoretical literature on the role of public subsidies does not oﬀer a clear inter-
pretation, nor a benchmark with which to compare empirical ﬁndings. Rationale for aid
is under debate: growth theorists stress the role of subsidies as a tool to help the system
reach a desirable growth path; on the other hand, there has been criticism, that highlights
the risks of displacement of private investments.
When evaluating a public policy, however, it must be observed that rarely the interven-
tion results from a clear, theoretically sound, rationale. The Trentino economic structure
is widely based on small and medium ﬁrms. Despite the entrepreneurial ﬂair, common to
the whole North East of Italy, the Trentino economy suﬀers from being mainly based on
traditional industries and follows a path of slow productivity growth. In the beginning
of the 1990s it faced, like the rest of Italy, a slowdown in employment, from which it
promptly recovered aa a consequence of the depreciation of the lira. The policies under
analysis, i.e. those fostering public aid to private ﬁrms, were created at the beginning of
the 1980s. The same laws were in place until the end of the century (the new regional
law dates back to 1999): criteria for granting the aid was adapted from time to time to
a changing environment. When evaluating the eﬀects of public aid, it is diﬃcult to focus
on a speciﬁc goal the decision maker had in mind.
These considerations lead us to contribute to the debate with an empirical analysis
aiming at shedding some light on at two main issues. The ﬁrst one is methodological; the
second one is concerned with policy implications.
From a methodological point of view, our contribution can be viewed as an empirical
20procedure to adapt the Matching Models to the ﬁeld object of study. We coped with
problems related to: (a) the deﬁnition of variables to be employed in the analysis; (b) the
choice of the correct matching estimator and the correct form of the propensity score in
presence of lagged variables. Moreover, we suggested using the panel data to explore the
time span to evaluate the policies’ eﬀects.
From a policy perspective, on the other hand, we contributed to three diﬀerent issues
related to three broad categories of goals typically associated with subsidies. The ﬁrst
one regards the ability of public aid to improve factors’ productivity and/or proﬁtability,
that is their ability to promote self-sustained virtuous cycles. While it is true that ﬁrms
which have access to aid are able to increase their investments, at least in the short run,
the only eﬀect we observe is an even shorter term increase in labor productivity, which
quickly disappears over time. From this standpoint we can conclude that subsidies do not
produce any long lasting eﬀect in terms of productivity.
A second observation deals with the ability of subsidies to promote the adoption of
innovative technologies by means of capital investment. In this regard, both the obser-
vations regarding capital and labor productivity and the ambiguous (and statistically
insigniﬁcant) eﬀects of the policy in terms of capital intensiﬁcation, seem to point to a
diﬀerent explanation. Namely, It looks like the most noticeable eﬀect of public subsi-
dies lies in the anticipation of investments, through the radial expansion of the current
technology.
A third issue deals with the promotion of growth. In this case our data suggest
that public aid can promote employment signiﬁcantly for subsidized ﬁrms. This increase
translates into a growth in terms of total sales, which, albeit not a legitimate goal per se,
might be a signiﬁcant policy objective in a regional environment characterized by a large
amount of small ﬁrms.
This most glaring eﬀect, together with the previous one, suggests that public aid
promote the development of existing ﬁrm, without any particular change in technology
21or factor combination. Whether this could of any worth for the regional economy or not,
much depends from the size of displacement potential entrant or non aided ﬁrms could
suﬀer.
Notwithstanding these results, this work is still subject to some limits, that could be
seen as starting points for further research.
A natural methodological extension is related to the possibility to fully exploit the
panel structure of the data. In fact, within the current framework it is impossible to
account for unobserved heterogeneity stemming from hidden control variables. This could
help capture the interactions between investment subsidies and the business cycle. To
follow this path it is necessary to work on the theoretical foundations of the statistical
properties and the robustness of matching estimators in a panel data framework. White
and Chalak (2006) propose a framework which, once fully developed, could provide the
appropriate methodology.
A second extension is linked with the future availability of data regarding a new local
law regulating the concession of subsidies, that partly overlaps with the law under analysis:
The Provincial Law 6/99. Integrating these new data into the dataset and studying the
composition eﬀects arising from the interactions of the two policy interventions is a second
straightforward direction for further research. A further empirical extension, could be
carried out in the direction of a more precise test of the productivity eﬀects of public
aid: on this respect, a decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index using a non
parametric frontier estimation would be a promising path.
Notes
1Note that diﬀerently from many datasets used in industrial economics literature we do not suﬀer from
any data loss due to the low size threshold of ﬁrms. As a result, we are able to study small ﬁrms’ dynamics
22that are often neglected in other studies. Moreover, we do not have any problem of representativeness of
the sample under analysis and our results directly apply directly to the economy we are referring to.
2See Gallo (2003) for more in-depth knowledge about the information contained in the DM10 form
and to gain further insights into the underlining legislation of social security law.
3The ﬁscal code number (Partita IVA) provided us with a common code where we could merge the
data into a single panel.
4See Klette et al. (2000) Heckman et al. (1998) and Jaffe (2002) for an exhaustive review of the
literature on this issue.
5See Petersen (2003) and Lechner (2002) for an interesting application of the MMs to the role of
labor market policies.
6For a discussion on the use of average treatment eﬀect on treated on evaluation studies see Heckman
and Robb (1984) and Heckman et al. (1997).
7See on the issue Heckman and Robb (1984) and Imbens (2004).
8A third property that the propensity score satisﬁes is: 0 < P(x) = Prob(D = 1|X = x) < 1, that
ensures meaningful boundaries for the propensity of ﬁrms to be included in treatment.
9See Becker and Ichino (2002) for a detailed description of matching estimators.
10Estimation results do not change signiﬁcantly considering other matching estimators, such as kernel
matching, radius matching and nearest neighbor matching.
11The use of the Probit form does not change the results and does not compromise the veriﬁcation of
balancing property.
12The bootstrapped standard errors are obtained as standard deviation of the ATTs distribution, in
which each estimation refers to a sample of ﬁrms in the control group.
13It can also be that they expand along a radial expansion of a ﬁxed factor Leontief technology.
14The empirical evidence we gathered cannot thoroughly disentangle a the diﬀerent eﬀects of invest-
ment. A more precise test of the radial expansion hypothesis could make use of a DEA analysis of
23Malmquist productivity index, in the line proposed by F¨ are and Grosskopf (1996).
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28year: 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
frequency: 12 53 146 62 59 81 81 119
year: 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
frequency: 98 111 149 102 179
Source: PINC8199.
Table 1: Provincial Law 4/81: number of ﬁrms involved in the program. Yearly distribu-











Table 2: Frequency distribution of ﬁrms in the database PINC8199.
29treat9899 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
add98du -4.200 1.237 -3.390 0.001
dadd99 -0.004 0.004 -1.060 0.028
invadd98 -0.001 0.001 -0.620 0.537
invaddsq98 0.000 0.000 1.400 0.162
roesq98 -0.099 0.073 -1.350 0.176
roiroe98 -0.502 1.154 -0.430 0.664
roe98 -0.385 0.236 -1.630 0.103
roi98 -0.564 1.438 -0.390 0.695
kxadd98 0.000 0.000 -1.070 0.285
at1dd 1.627 0.270 6.030 0.000
at1df 0.439 0.338 1.300 0.193
VAxadd98 0.003 0.001 2.770 0.006
const. -1.782 0.255 -6.990 0.000
LRχ2(12): 117.54 Prob > χ2: 0.000
Pseudo R2: 0.1947 Number of obs: 563
Source: PINC8199.
Table 3: The estimation of the propensity score for the treatment treat9899: subsidized
ﬁrms in one of the years 1998, 1999.
Inferior
of block treat9899
of PS 0 1 Total
0.01 97 2 99
0.10 99 5 104
0.15 55 20 75
0.20 73 20 93
0.40 76 79 155
0.60 3 0 3
0.80 0 2 2
Total 403 128 531
Source: PINC8199.
Table 4: The distribution of the PS for treated and control groups in the region of common
support.
30Variable: year: ATT Std. dev. t-value
Direct eﬀects
Investments 2001 496.36 255.367 1.944
(Mln lire) 2002 2228.726 1940.259 1.149
2003 264.631 356.804 0.742
Proﬁtability
ROI 2001 0.013 0.023 0.588
(%) 2002 0.022 0.013 1.663
2003 0.005 0.013 0.357
ROE 2001 0.108 0.127 0.849
(%) 2002 -0.012 0.435 -0.027
2003 -0.14 0.119 -1.182
EBITDA/L 2001 4.001 4.502 0.889
(mln lire) 2002 7.735 8.114 0.953
2003 5.416 6.136 0.883
Productivity
VA/L 2001 17.512 12.244 1.43
(mln lire) 2002 12.014 17.841 0.673
2003 5.33 10.875 0.49
VA/K 2001 0.741 0.979 0.757
(mln lire) 2002 0.5 0.673 0.743
2003 1.662 0.729 0.28
Size
Employees 2001 4.506 1.653 2.726
(number of) 2002 5.327 1.858 2.868
2003 5.202 1.598 3.255
Total sales 2001 1817.052 816.298 2.226
(mln lire) 2002 3638.666 2475.407 1.470
2003 3460.532 981.760 3.525
Growth rates 2001 8.68 5.333 1.628
of total sales 2002 10.07 5.883 1.712
(%) 2003 6.129 30.179 -0.203
Capital intensity
K/L 2001 6.816 51.061 0.133
(mln lire) 2002 -0.522 91.693 -0.006
2003 25.914 79.390 0.326
Legenda: signiﬁcant eﬀects in bold.
Source: PINC8199.
Table 5: Estimation of average treatment eﬀects on treated.
31